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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 







STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
9116 
Respondent does not dispute the statement of facts 
set forth in appellant's brief, except that Dr. A. C. Curtis 
began his examination of prosecutrix at 11 o'clock. (T-5) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING 
A DOCTOR TO TESTIFY THAT HIS EXAMIN-
ATION INDICATED THE COMPLAINING 
WITNESS HAD BEEN A VIRGIN PRIOR TO 
THE TIME OF THE EXAMINATION. 
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POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING AP-
PELLANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION DI-
RECTING THE JURY TO RETURN A NOT 
GUILTY VERDICT. 
POINT III. 
EVEN IF THE COURT DID ERR AS URGED 
IN APPELLANTS' POINTS I AND II, SAID 
ERROR WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING 
A DOCTOR TO TESTIFY THAT HIS EXAMIN-
ATION INDICATED THE COMPLAINING 
WITNESS HAD BEEN A VIRGIN PRIOR TO 
THE TIME OF THE EXAMINATION. 
Here the exact question objected to by appellants is 
as follows: "Now does a hymen which is intact normally 
indicate a person who is a virgin?" Over appellants' ob-
jections, the question was allowed and was answered 
"Yes." 
At the time of making his objection, counsel for ap-
pellants claimed it was "immaterial." In his brief he now 
claims that the only effect of the question and answer was 
to excite passion and prejudice in the minds of the jury. 
Respondent does not believe that the question was 
asked in an attempt to excite passion and prejudice, nor 
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that such was its result. It did not stand by itself, but in-
stead was asked in a context which included other ques-
tions, the intent and effect of which were only to show 
that the prosecutrix had recently experienced sexual pen-
tration. 
The transcript of testimony, beginning at line 28 of 
page 5, and continuing to line 16 of page 6, reads as 
follows: 
"Q Would you tell us what you observed, Doc-
tor, which led you to believe that she had had 
intercourse? 
A Yes. On the examination table she was put 
in a good position where we could make an ex-
amination of her female organs and we found the 
perineum covered with blood and mucus and 
serum, and by opening the lips of the vagina we 
could see the hymen, and the hymen had been 
torn, and it was recently torn because the tears 
were fresh and they were still bleeding. 
Q Now does a hymen which is intact normally 
indicate a person who is a virgin? 
MR. CHRISTENSON: We object to that as being 
immaterial? 
THE COURT: He may answer. 
A Yes. 
Q And you say in this case the hymen had been 
torn? 
A Yes. 
Q And there was blood on it? 
A Yes?" 
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As is readily seen, the fact of sexual penetration nec-
essarily had to be proven in order to establish that rape 
had occurred, since it is a necessary element of the 
crime. 
So, properly, the District Attorney asked the doctor 
how, from his own observation, he came to believe that 
intercourse had taken place. In his answer (at line 1, 
page 6 of the transcript), he testified to his examination 
of the prosecutrix' female organs, one of his observations 
being that the hymen had been torn and that tears were 
fresh and still bleeding. 
It was a logical and normal thing at this point for 
the District Attorney to ask the question to which appel-
lants object since some members of the jury might not 
have known, had the doctor not so stated, that an intact 
hymen is an indication of a woman who has not expe-
rienced sexual penetration, and by the same token that 
a torn hyn1en indicates the possibility, at least, of one 
whose organs have been penetrated sexually. 
It is difficult to imagine how the jury could have be-
come inflamed with passion and prejudice upon hearing 
this scientific question and its answer when it had notal-
ready become so upon hearing the preceding question and 
the gruesarne details in the doctor's answer, a question, 
incidentally, which was not objected to by appellants. 
Respondent believes the question about the hymen 
was in all regards proper, and that it was asked only in 
an effort to give the jury an understanding of female 
physiology sufficient to enable it properly to render its 
verdict. Respondent does not believe that it aroused pas-
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5 
sion and prejudice in the minds of the jury, particularly 
in light of the other questions in the context of which it 
was asked. 
The first sentence of appellants' first point states: 
"The general rule is that in prosecutions for rape by 
force and without consent, evidence of the prior chastity 
of the prosecutrix is inadmissible as a substantive defense 
* * * ." Respondent believes that the word "chastity'' 
was used in error and that the word properly should have 
been "unchastity." ( 44 Am. Jur. 958) 
The text cited by appellants on page 7 of their brief 
and the Scott case deal entirely with attempts by defend-
ants to show unchastity on the part of the prosecutrix. 
Here, quite to the contrary, her chastity was shown. It is a 
fair assumption that a 15-year-old girl who has been raped 
was, up to that time, a virgin, testimony to the contrary 
being inadmissible, and the proof of the assumed fact 
certainly is not prejudicial to the defendant. 
Finally, even if error did occur, respondent does not 
believe it was prejudicial, under all the circumstances. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING AP-
PELLANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION DI-
RECTING THE JURY TO RETURN A NOT 
GUILTY VERDICT. 
Respondent cannot understand how appellants se-
riously can urge that evidence in the record was not such 
that the jury could properly bring in a verdict of guilty. 
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True, there was some conflict, particularly as to cir-
cumstantial or inconsequential matters in the testimony 
of the three girls, all of whom were called to the stand by 
the State. However, the existence of such conflict did not 
in any way preclude the jury from giving full credit to 
the testimony of the prosecutrix while at the same time 
disregarding or discounting testimony of the State's other 
witnesses in conflict therewith. 
The State's case could have rested entirely upon the 
testimony of a single witness, the prosecutrix, and there 
was no absolute necessity for the testimony of the other 
girls at all, nor was the jury obligated to believe what 
they said. 
The Utah case of Seybold v. Union Pacific Railroad 
Company, 239 P2d. 174, 121 Utah 61, states that in this 
way: 
"* * * After referring to a variety of methods of 
phrasing the rule and a great many authorities he 
[Wigmore] concludes the section with this: 'Per-
haps the best statement of the test is: Are there 
facts in evidence which if unanswered would 
justify men of ordinary reason and fairness in af-
firming the question which the plaintiff is bound 
to maintain.' 
"We approve the rule thus stated by Mr. Wigmore. 
If there is any substantial competent evidence upon 
which a jury acting fairly and reasonably could 
make the finding, it should stand." 
Here the prosecutrix stated clearly and simply that she 
had been raped by the defendants. This was the important 
thing. In addition her further testimony was such as to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
show an opportunity as to time and place for the perform-
ance of the acts. 
As a matteT of fact, the testimony of the other two 
girls to the effect that they were gone from the car for 
perhaps five minutes would not, in and of itself, even if 
believed, necessarily eliminate the possibility of rape, since 
the act could have been accomplished within such a time 
period. The estimate of the girls at best was only a guess 
and this, of course, was taken into consideration by the 
jury. 
Obviously the same period of time would seem much 
shorter to the two others who were off in the canyon 
"going to the bathroom," than to the prosecutrix fearfully 
engaged in fighting off two men trying to rape her. 
·Interestingly, even defendant Hallam estimated the 
time at ten minutes (T-58). 
One of the other two girls called by the State was a 
sister of one of the defendants. (T-45). The jury had the 
right, said relationship having been placed in evidence, 
to consider the same, and to evaluate her testimony in the 
light thereof. The interest or bias of a witness, or the ab-
sence thereof, should always be considered as affecting 
the weight of his testimony. 
Appellants rely somewhat on Schlatter v. McCarthy, 
196 P.2d 968, 113 U. 543, and quote the following state-
ment from that case: 
"Generally a party who calls a witness vouches 
for his veTacity and cannot afterwards impeach 
such witness, either by testimony of an impeach-
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ing witness or by argument to the jury and he 
may not argue to the jury that such witness is 
unworthy of belief." 
Here, however, the State is not attempting to impeach 
any of the witnesses even though they did give somewhat 
contradictory testimony on minor points. 
The Schlatter case goes on, however, in some detail 
to point out that a party is not bound by everything stated 
by his witness. The actual language of the court, occurring 
on page 975, is as follows: 
"* * * But a party is not bound by every state-
ment that his witness makes, and he may, by 
testimony of other witnesses and in argument to 
the jury, show that the facts were different from 
those testified to by the witness. This is permitted, 
not for the purpose of impeaching the witness (al-
though it may have that incidental effect), but 
for establishing the true facts. It would be a mon-
strous rule that would bind a party to every state-
ment of every witness produced by him. It is com-
mon experience that several eye-witnesses to an 
occurrence will have different versions of the 
same transaction. A party who calls several eye-
witnesses is entitled to argue before the jury that 
they should believe the facts to be as testified to by 
the witness most favorable to him. This is not an 
attack upon the veracity of the other witnesses 
called by him whose testimony may be different in 
some respects from that of others, but merely an 
attempt to convince the jury that the facts are 
really as contended by him. * * *" 
As to the ultimate question, that is, whetheT or not 
sexual penetration occurred, only the prosecutrix, of the 
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three women, was in any position to know, since the seat 
of the automobile was lowered, (T-62) and since the other 
two women were at least 30 steps away from the car in 
the dark. (T-47). 
The only really important question was, did appel-
lants commit unlawful sexual acts with the prosecutrix 
or did they not? The question of the amount of time 
available for the perpetration of the act is not of grave 
consequence. This is not a matter of circumstantial evi-
dence alone, as to the commission of the act, but instead 
is one of direct testimony by the person best able to know 
the facts. 
At page 12 of appellants' brief, they claim that con-
siderably more than two hours elapsed between the time 
of the alleged attack and the time when the complaining 
witness was examined by Dr. Curtis, who stated that her 
injuries in his opinion had occurred within one or two 
hours previously. Appellant says this is so because the 
evidence indicated the parties arrived back in Payson 
before ten minutes to 10:00 p.m. and that the attack must 
have occurred prior to this time. 
It is submitted that appellant is in error in setting 
midnight as the time of the examination, since it is clearly 
set forth on page 5 of the transcript at lines 4 through 7 
that the examination began at 11:00 o'clock. 
Thus, even assuming Dr. Curtis' opinion as to the 
two hours was correct, the attack still could have taken 
place as early as 9:00 o'clock and been within his estimate, 
since while the transcript is not specific on the point, it 
is likely Dr. Curtis' estimate of the time of the attack 
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was. made with reference to the time of beginning of the 
examination--or 11:00 o'clock. 
It is interesting to note that while the other girls said 
they did not hear prosecutrix yell and scream (T. 43, 45, 
47;) as she claims to have done (T-36), Defendant Hallam 
himself testified that prosecutrix "started kicking and 
hollering1' (T-73) when he tried to pull her pants down. 
On appeal the courts are reluctant, of course, to over-
rule findings of fact made by juries. This rule has been 
stated and restated time and time again. In a recent Utah 
case entitled Cottrell v. Grand Union Tea Co., 299 P.2d 
622, 5 U.2d 187, decided in 1956, the court, speaking 
through Justice Crockett, said: 
"This case having been tried to a jury, they were 
the exclusive judges of the evidence and of the in-
ferences to be drawn therefrom. It was not the 
privilege of the court to disagree with and over-
rule their action unless the evidence so unerringly 
pointed to a contrary conclusion that there existed 
no reasonable basis for the jury's finding. This 
court has many times affirmed commitment to a 
policy of reluctance to interfere with findings of 
fact and verdicts rendered by juries, and has de-
clared that it should be done only when the matter 
is so clear as to be free from doubt * * *." 
POINT III. 
EVEN IF THE COURT DID ERR AS URGED 
IN APPELLANTS' POINTS I AND II, SAID 
ERROR WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL. 
One good statement of the court's general attitude in 
this regard is that taken from the case of State v. Neal, 
262 P.2d 756, 1 U.2d 122: 
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"We are also conscious of the fact that a trial in 
the courts of this state is a proceeding in the in-
terest of justice to determine the guilt or innocence 
of the accused, and not just a game. We will not re-
verse criminal cases for mere error or irregularity. 
It is only where there has been error which is 
both substantial and prejudicial to the rights of the 
accused that a reversal is warranted. The defend-
ant was entitled to a full and fair presentation of 
the case to a jury of unbiased citizens and to have 
his rights safeguarded by competent counsel." 
CONCLUSION 
The Court did not err in permitting a doctor to testify 
that his examination indicated the complaining witness 
had been a virgin prior to the time of the examination, 
nor did it err in denying appellants' requested instruction 
directing the jury to return a not guilty verdict. 
If, however, eTror was committed in either regard, 
such error was not prejudicial to the substantive rights 
of the appellants and therefore their appeal should be dis-
missed and an order issued affirming the decision of the 
Trial Court. 
Respectfully submitted 
Oct. 20, 1959 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorney General 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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